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Gender Identity Disorder 
Jennifer McKitrick
1. Introduction 
According to the DSM IV, a person with GID is a male or female that feels 
a strong identification with the opposite sex and experiences considerable stress 
because of their actual sex (Task Force on DSM-IV and American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 2000). The way GID is characterized by health professionals, patients, 
and lay people belies certain assumptions about gender that are strongly held, yet 
nevertheless questionable. The phenomena of transsexuality and sex-reassign-
ment surgery puts into stark relief the following question: “What does it mean 
to be male or female?” But while the answer to that question may be informed by 
contemplation of GID, we should also be aware that the answer to the question 
“what does it mean to have GID?” is shaped by our concepts of male and female. 
First, I consider the concept of transsexuality, and explain how it forces us 
to clarify our concepts of sex and gender, and leads to the development of what 
I will call the “standard view.” I then explain GID from a mental-health stand-
point, question the concept of gender identity, and try to uncover some funda-
mental assumptions of the standard view. I argue that these assumptions are at 
odds with the plausible view that gender supervenes on physical, psychological, 
and/or social properties. I go on to argue, contra the standard view, that gen-
der has no essence. I suggest an anti-essentialist account of gender according to 
which “man” and “woman” are cluster concepts. This undermines the dualistic 
conception of gender that grounds the standard view. An anti-essentialist view 
of gender cannot make sense of the concept of “gender identity” and hence sees 
so-called “GID” as primarily conflict between the individual and her society, and 
only derivatively a conflict between the individual and her body. 
2. Transsexuality and the Concepts of Male and Female 
Consideration of transsexuality both reveals and challenges assumptions 
about what it means to be male or female. The expressions “sex change” and “sex 
reassignment surgery” suggest a person goes into surgery as one sex and after 
the procedure emerges as the other sex. This assumes that the features that are re-
moved are sufficient to be a member of the former sex, and the features that are 
added are features that are sufficient to be a member the new sex. So, a man can 
become a woman by first ceasing to be a man, which is accomplished by castra-
tion. Breast implants and a vaginoplasty complete the transition. According to 
this standpoint, “male” and “female,” “man” and “woman” are defined in terms 
of primary and secondary sex anatomy. 
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However, most people have views that are somewhat more complex. Adam/
Linda Parascandola, a biological female, says: “I knew from a young age that I 
was male despite all external appearances” (Parascandola, 2001). The documen-
tary “The Opposite Sex” characterizes a preoperative FtM as “a man with a very 
serious birth defect” (2004b). According to MtF Jennifer Diane Reitz “a transsex-
ual is a mind that is literally, physically, trapped in a body of the opposite sex” 
(Reitz, 2004). Parascandola articulates the view as follows: “men and women are 
the only two types of humans and … transsexuals have simply had their wires 
crossed and belong to the sex opposite to the one they were born into” (Parascan-
dola, 2001). 
While initially one might think that “man” and “woman” are two simple cat-
egories, transsexuality forces us to realize that the defining features of these cat-
egories are not always found together. We are compelled to refine our concepts 
and make finer distinctions—distinguishing biological sex from psychological 
sex, in other words, distinguishing “sex” from “gender.” While sex refers to the 
biological characteristics that mark one as male or female, gender is a collection 
of behavioral and personality features differentially associated with a particular 
sex. We might further distinguish sex and gender from “gender role”—a set of 
behaviors, relationships, responsibilities and expectations that are more typical 
of a male or female within a given society (Horvath, 1999). Gender roles typically 
include sexual behaviors and relationships. 
We can now use these distinctions to characterize the “standard view” of 
transsexuality. According to Transsexual.org, “in a nutshell: transsexuality means 
having the wrong body for the gender one really is.” The preoperative transsex-
ual is in “a state of conflict between gender and physical sex” (Reitz, 2004). He 
wants to function in the gender role appropriate to his gender, not his sex. He 
wants his body to approximate as much as possible the type of body that is ap-
propriate for his gender, and that would allow him to “pass” in his preferred 
gender role. Back in 1959, MtF Tamara Rees put it like this: 
This surgery does not create a woman where the patient was once a biolog-
ical male, nor can the patient ever hope to have children. It merely brings 
the physical appearance of the patient into harmony with the mental pattern 
(Rees, 1959). 
Approximately 40,000 (1/2,500) U.S. males have undergone sex reassignment 
surgery (Conway, 2002). While approximately 1/3 as many women undergo sur-
gery, it is estimated that many more pass as males without surgical or clinical 
intervention. 
GID is the more general disorder of which transsexuality is the most extreme 
type. Estimates of the prevalence of GID range from 1 in 30,000 to 1 in 500 (2004a; 
Conway, 2002). Many patients have milder forms of the disorder, often undiag-
nosed. Indications of GID include: a strong and persistent cross-gender identifi-
cation; a stated desire to be the other sex; frequent passing as the other sex; a de-
sire to live or be treated as the other sex; a conviction that s/he has the typical 
feelings and reactions of the other sex; a persistent discomfort with his/her sex; a 
sense of inappropriateness of the gender role of his/her own sex; a belief that s/
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he was born the wrong sex; a preoccupation with changing primary and second-
ary sex characteristics; and lack of any physical intersex condition. (If a person 
meeting the above criteria were of ambiguous sex biologically, s/he would not be 
diagnosed with GID) (Task Force on DSM-IV and American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2000). The standard of care for patients with GID is to offer three stages of 
therapy: hormones, life experiences in the desired gender role, and sex reassign-
ment surgery, though not all persons with GID want or require all three elements 
of the therapy (2004a). 
3. What Is Gender Identity? 
As stated, the GID patient suffers from “cross-gender identification” or 
“strong identification with the opposite sex.” But what does it mean to identify 
with the opposite sex? In general, to identify with a group is to feel you are sim-
ilar to members of that group and that you are or should be part of that group. 
So, to identify with males is to feel that you are similar to men in some important 
way and that you are or should be a man. When a biologically male has a cross-
gender identification, she believes that she is or should be a woman. That is to 
say, she has a female gender identity. 
Obviously, the concept of “gender identity” is central to understanding 
GID. Kohlberg defines “gender identity” as “the ability to discriminate be-
tween males and females and to accurately identify one’s own sex” (Kohlberg, 
1966). If we assume that an accurate identification of one’s sex is supposed to 
be in accord with one’s biological sex, then it would seem that GID patients 
lack this ability to some extent. Hence, an implication of Kohlberg’s definition is 
that GID patients have an inadequate or nonexistent gender identity. But most 
people think that the GID patient has a gender identity, but one that is atypi-
cal for his or her biological sex. Renowned sex and gender psychologist John 
Money describes gender identity as one’s inner sense that one is male or female 
(Money, 1976). Since persons with GID typically report an early awareness of 
cross-gender identification, and since psychologists have had little success at 
changing a patient’s gender to fit his or her sex, it is thought that each individ-
ual has a gender identity that is formed before birth or early in childhood, and 
that identity is immutable in later life. 
For most women, a female gender identity is possessed in conjunction with 
a certain cluster of anatomical features (including breasts and ovaries) and so-
cial roles (such as care-giver and unpaid domestic laborer). But according to the 
standard view of GID, one can have a female gender identity even if one is a bi-
ological male. And, since someone with a female gender identity can be living 
one’s life as a man, it seems that one can have a female gender identity even if 
one does not play the social role associated with being female. Note that having 
a feminine gender identity is not the same thing as merely being effeminate. A 
man can be effeminate without thinking that he is or should be a woman, and 
a biological male can display predominately masculine characteristics while 
claiming to have a female gender identity. Many MtF transsexuals have to learn 
feminine mannerisms and gestures in order to pass as women. It follows that 
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one can have a female gender identity even if one does not tend to behave as 
most women do. 
This leaves the nature of gender identity somewhat mysterious. Supposedly, 
the biological female with GID has an inner sense that he is male. To which I 
ask “he has an inner sense that he is what, exactly?” Does he have an inner sense 
that he is biologically male? That he has a Y chromosome, testicular tissue, a pe-
nis, a preponderance of testosterone in his system, etc.? No. Usually, he is aware 
that he does not have these features. If he had a persistent belief that he did have 
these features, despite all manner of empirical evidence to the contrary, then 
GID would be akin to a delusional condition such as “somatozation disorder” or 
“body image distortion,” which is unlikely. The FtM knows he is not biologically 
male—that’s the source of his distress. So, his sense that he is male is not a belief 
that he is biologically male. 
Perhaps he has a sense that he is psychologically male. But what does it mean 
to be psychologically male? Earlier, we equated being psychologically male with 
having a male gender identity. But if having a male gender identity is having an 
inner sense that one is psychologically male, we have a tight circle of inter-de-
fined terms, and the nature of “gender identity” remains mysterious. In saying 
that a biological female has an inner sense that he is male, what belief are we at-
tributing to him? Perhaps it is the belief that he possesses some ineffable essence 
of masculinity. 
The standard view seems to regard gender identity as the essence of what it 
means to be a man or a woman. It is supposed that this essence can be possessed 
in the face of contravening biological, anatomical, psychological, behavioral, and 
social features. It is further supposed that gender comes in just two types, mas-
culine and feminine, and that a masculine gender is appropriate for a male body 
and a masculine gender role, and a feminine gender is appropriate for a female 
body and a feminine gender role. Given that gender role includes sexual behav-
iors and relationships, the standard view also involves the assumption that some-
one with a female gender identity will be sexually and romantically interested in 
males, and that someone with a male gender identity will be likewise interested 
in females. This would explain the longstanding suspicion that homosexuality is 
a type of GID (Horvath, 1999). It also explains the fact that attraction to the op-
posite biological sex is considered a maladjustment for transsexuals (Meyerow-
itz, 2002). (The comedian Stephen Wright jokes “I’m a lesbian trapped in a man’s 
body.” Why is this supposed to be funny? Because of a failure to distinguish sex-
ual orientation from gender identity.) 
4. Gender Supervenes 
The assumptions underlying the standard view are at odds with some plausi-
ble claims about the nature of gender. One of these claims is that, whatever gen-
der is, it supervenes on biological, psychological, and/or social properties. If you 
fix the biological, psychological, and social facts, you thereby fix the gender facts. 
Gender facts are not “further facts.” If you know an individual’s genetic makeup, 
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anatomical features, psychological and behavioral profile, role in a particular so-
ciety, and the gender norms of that society, you know more than all there is to 
know about that person’s gender in that society. 
If a female gender identity is something each human being either does or does 
not have, what does it supervene on? What is it based on? If, as the standard view 
claims, a biological male can have a female gender identity, then obviously gen-
der identity cannot supervene on the typical markers of biological sex, such as 
chromosomes, reproductive organs, and the like. I’ll consider four alternative 
suggestions. 
Proponents of the standard view talk as if there is some irreducible fact of 
the matter as to a person’s gender identity. So, one possible view is that gender 
identity doesn’t supervene on anything. Is it a sui generis property that does not 
yield to further analysis. This is a flat denial of the idea that gender supervenes 
on biological, psychological, and/or social properties. But if gender doesn’t su-
pervene, then perfect duplicates could differ with respect to gender. (Interest-
ingly, there have been a few documented cases of homozygous twins raised to-
gether, where one twin reported a cross-gender identification and the other did 
not. However, this is not a case of perfect duplicates differing with respect to 
gender. Clearly, there was some psychological difference between them, but the 
cause of that psychological difference is not known (2002).) If gender does not 
supervene, then gender is disconnected from everything we can know about 
a person—their physical, psychological, and relational properties—and it is 
not clear how the concept could be fit for any role in psychological theory or 
practice. 
A related view is that a having female gender identity is not based on any-
thing physical; rather, it is based on having a female soul. This response couples 
male/female dualism with mind/body dualism. I suspect this “mind/body/gen-
der” dualism, as I call it, is a deep unarticulated ideology that underlies many of 
the thoughts that people have on issues of gender. But what makes a soul a fe-
male soul, rather than some other gender? Perhaps the answer is as ineffable as 
souls themselves. In that case, this view is as unsatisfying as the view that gender 
is sui generous, for it leaves gender floating free from a person’s knowable charac-
teristics. Perhaps a better answer is that a female soul has certain distinctive ten-
dencies, desires, and beliefs. That would be to say, in short, that what makes a 
soul a female soul is its psychological properties. If this is the view, then it would 
be better expressed by saying that gender supervenes on psychological proper-
ties, leaving aside the controversial issue of whether having these properties has 
anything to do with having a soul. 
So, let’s consider the suggestion is that having a female gender identity 
depends on having certain key psychological characteristics. As I noted, the 
standard view holds that someone can have a female gender identity even if 
one lacks many typical feminine mannerisms, habits, and dispositions. Per-
haps having a female gender identity supervenes on the psychological prop-
erty of having a strong and persistent belief that you are a woman. But again, 
that merely pushes back the question: What exactly is it that you believe 
about yourself? This property you attribute to yourself—what does it super-
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vene on? Perhaps there are some deeper aspects of personality that define one 
as a woman. 
However, people that are uncontroversially women display a wide range of 
personality types and share various aspects of personality with many men. To 
develop the view that gender supervenes on psychology, we would need to ad-
dress the following questions: Which psychological characteristics are masculine 
and which are feminine? How do we determine which psychological characteris-
tics are key? Is it up to us how to define our concepts, or is there some indepen-
dent fact of the matter? Are these characteristics fixed for all times and places, or 
do they vary from culture to culture? Being feminine has meant different things 
to different people at different times. We should also keep in mind that whatever 
features one specifies, be they emotional expressiveness, nurturing, or submis-
siveness, etc., these characteristics will admit of degrees, and are unlikely to be 
exclusive to women. 
Another suggestion is that having a female gender identity depends on hav-
ing a feminine brain. On the standard view, even biological males can have fem-
inine brains, especially if their prenatal environment lacked sufficient testoster-
one. Transsexual. org defines a transsexual as “a person in which the sex-related 
structures of the brain that define gender identity are exactly opposite the phys-
ical sex organs of the body” (Reitz, 2004). However, this suggestion is little more 
than an article of faith unless someone can tell us which structures of the brain 
define gender identity. Science has yet to demarcate clear brain differences be-
tween “normal” men and women. The results of research on differences between 
male and female corpus callosi are sketchy (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Other research 
focuses on a region of the hypothalamus known as the BSTc. Males are said to av-
erage twice as many neurons in this area as females. Some studies indicate that 
transsexuals have neuron numbers atypical of their biological sex, but typical of 
the sex that they believe should be (Zhou et al., 1997). However, the relationship 
between the BSTc and gender behavior is unclear. According to Christopher Hor-
vath, “There is as of yet no explicit neuropsychological theory that links brain 
structures to gender traits” (Horvath, 1999). Furthermore, one needs some char-
acterization of gender traits and gender behavior before one can label the brain 
structures that cause those traits and behaviors “gendered.” And furthermore, 
even if clear sex differences were found in the brain, we would still need to de-
termine the causes of those differences: if brain differences were caused by differ-
ential environment conditions, we might see gender identity as a malleable prod-
uct of gender socialization. And whatever the causes, any differences would be 
matters of degree, with a spectrum of variation ranging from highly feminine to 
highly masculine. 
The claim that gender supervenes on biological, psychological, and/or social 
properties is very modest and plausible. However, the standard view has trouble 
accommodating this claim, for since proponents seem to hold that gender iden-
tity can vary independently of most biological, psychological and social proper-
ties. Furthermore, the idea that gender supervenes does not sit comfortably with 
a further tenet of the standard view, that every person has a gender identity that 
is either male or female. If one couples gender dualism with the view that gen-
der supervenes, one is committed to the view that the vast array of human social, 
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psychological and neurological properties sort themselves into two types. This is 
in tension with the fact that there is little consensus about which properties con-
stitute the supervenience base for a female gender identity as apposed to a male 
gender identity, and also with the fact that the properties that are likely candi-
dates for the supervenience base are possessed by individuals in a broad spec-
trum of varying degrees. So, part of the reason that the standard view is at odds 
with the claim that gender supervenes is because of the second claim about gen-
der that I defend—that gender has no essence. 
5. Gender Has No Essence 
If gender supervenes, then having a masculine or feminine gender will de-
pend on having certain physical, psychological, and/or social characteristics. But 
which characteristics? There is no simple answer. There is no single trait, or defi-
nite set of traits, had by all members of a gender, across cultures, throughout his-
tory. There is no single set of features that is necessary and sufficient for being 
masculine, or for being feminine. Gender is at best a matter of having enough of 
a number of different characteristics, to a sufficient degree, in a particular social 
context. 
One way to put this point is to say “gender has no essence.” I take it that for 
a kind to have an essence is for all and only members of that kind to necessarily 
share certain essential features. An essential feature of a kind is a property that a 
thing cannot lack whilst it is a member of that kind. Having four sides is an es-
sential feature of squares. The kind “squares” has an essence that consists in hav-
ing four sides of equal length, etc. But some kinds have no essence. For those 
kinds, there is no set of features that all and only members share. Rather, they are 
grouped together for some other reason, perhaps family resemblance. Of course, 
we find this idea in Wittgenstein: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-
games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them 
all?—Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be 
called “games”’—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—
For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationship, and a whole series of them at that. … And the result 
of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlap-
ping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
in detail. 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a 
family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and 
criss-cross in the same way (Wittgenstein, 1958). 
In the case of gender, there are no properties shared by all and only members of 
a particular gender (except for the gender property itself). However, we do find 
crisscrossing and overlapping similarities along various dimensions among the 
people we call “women.” 
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When a concept is applied to individuals based on an indeterminate cluster of 
interrelated traits and family resemblances, it is a cluster concept. I suggest that 
gender concepts are cluster concepts. But note: cluster concepts do not typically 
have sharp boundaries. We categorize someone as masculine or feminine if they 
have enough of certain characteristics, to a sufficient degree. But how many is 
enough, and what degree is sufficient? There is no precise answer, for the con-
cept is vague. If you could give a precise answer, you could state necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being a member of that kind. But since you can’t, there 
is possibly an array of better to worse exemplars of that kind. Boundaries could 
be drawn in a number of ways, but there are no sharp natural boundaries to be 
found. 
imagine having to sketch a sharply defined picture ‘corresponding’ to a 
blurred one. … [I]f the colors in the original merge without any hint of out-
line won’t it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to 
the blurred one? Won’t you then have to say: ‘Here I might as well draw a cir-
cle or a heart as a rectangle, for all the colors merge. Anything—and nothing—
is right.’ And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corre-
sponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics (Wittgenstein, 1958). 
And, I would add, this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corre-
sponding to our concepts of gender. If gender concepts are cluster concepts, vary-
ing degrees of masculinity and femininity along different dimensions, and bor-
derline cases, are likely. 
It is questionable whether even biological sex has an essence. In order for a 
sex to have an essence, there would have to be some feature or set of features 
that every member of that sex has. But every feature that seems like a candidate 
for being definitive of sex faces counterexamples—individuals who lack that fea-
ture who we nevertheless want to categorize as members of that sex. While this 
deserves much more consideration that I will give it here, allow me to mention a 
few suggestive examples (Dreger, 1998; Fausto-Sterling, 2000). 
Consider the suggestion that what is essential to being male or female is play-
ing a certain functional role. The most feasible candidate is a biological role—a 
role in reproduction. But of course, many humans play no role in reproduction 
due to age, sterility, or lifestyle choice, and we do not decline to call them male 
or female. (Or, do we want to say that an infertile woman in still a woman in the 
sense that a broken clock is still a clock?) 
Physical features, such as body size, strength, fat, and hair distribution 
generally differ between males and females. However, your stereotypical “98 
pound weakling” is nevertheless male. There is much variation and a fair 
amount of overlap between male and female, and so these characteristics are 
unlikely to add up to a set of necessary and sufficient traits. Neither primary 
nor secondary anatomical sex characteristics can fully define sex. A castrated 
man is still male. Breast size varies significantly among women and men. Some 
females have a vaginal agenesis, and are born without a vaginal canal. In the 
1800s, scientists and medical men thought that the essence of sex was the gonad 
(Dreger, 1998). If ever there was any doubt about the sex of an individual, ovar-
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ian tissue determined femaleness and testicular tissue determined maleness. 
However, after decades of being confronted with numerous cases of hermaph-
rodites who had the gonads of one sex, but the body type of the other sex, doc-
tors revised their views. 
One might then turn to hormones as the essence of sex difference. However, 
no type of hormone is exclusive to males or females. Each individual has a mix 
of hormones, and degrees of receptivity vary. Picking a particular mixture or 
threshold would seem to be an arbitrary decision when it comes to defining the 
essence of different kinds. Today, the tendency is to think that genes, particularly 
the 23rd pair of chromosomes, are the essence of sex. But consider someone with 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome—an XY individual whose body is not sensi-
tive to testosterone. Such a person does not develop male genitalia or second-
ary male sex characteristics, but instead develops a body type typical of a female. 
Most people are reluctant to call such individuals male. 
Perhaps certain features of the brain define sex. However, as far as we know, 
there is no anatomical structure in the brain of one sex that is totally lacking in 
other. One would have to compare differences in size of things like cross sections 
of the corpus callosum, or regions of the hypothalamus. However, differences in 
size and connectivity of various brain structures have multiple degrees of varia-
tion. Prenatal hormones influence brain development, but the precise mixture of 
prenatal hormones comes in more than two varieties. If brains can be feminine, it 
would stand to reason that some brains are more feminine than others. If being 
female means having a feminine brain, then it is a vague region of a continuum, 
rather than a discrete category exclusive to women. 
I’m not saying that “male” and “female” are fictions, or even social con-
structions. By and large, people tend to have a certain characteristics that easily 
allow us to categorize them as either male or female. However, there is no par-
ticular set of characteristics that each person must have in order to be male, or 
female. The concepts of male and female are cluster concepts, like the concept 
of a game. 
If we can’t define the essence of biological sex, how much less of a chance do 
we have of defining the essence of gender? There is no certain set of personality 
traits, such as being nurturing, intuitive, or sensitive, that is necessary and suffi-
cient for being feminine. Even more so than hormones and features of the brain, 
psychological traits are had in various combinations and degrees, with significant 
overlap between men and women. How else could men get in touch with their 
“feminine side”? Every person has a unique mix of psychological characteristics. 
It would follow that some people have a female gender identity to a certain ex-
tent, while others have a female gender identity to lesser extent. The division of 
gender into two types would seem to be arbitrary. 
One might suggest that we can define the essence of feminine gender by 
forming a disjunction of all of the sets of traits that are sufficient for having a fe-
male gender identity. However, it seems that gender concepts are too malleable 
and open-ended to permit such an analysis. The concept of femininity has not re-
mained constant over the centuries. It is quite plausible that some future person 
will exemplify some unanticipated cluster of traits that will qualify her as femi-
nine. Or, to quote Wittgenstein again: 
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But if someone wished to say: ‘There is something common to all these con-
structions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties’—I should 
reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: ‘Some-
thing runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of 
those fibers’(Wittgenstein, 1958). 
Because our gender concepts are cluster concepts with no precise boundaries, 
they are difficult to operationalize in any scientific way. In his paper “Measuring 
Gender,” Christopher Horvath examines a number of studies that have tried to 
establish a correlation between childhood gender non-conformity and adult ho-
mosexuality. In order to do so, researchers must determine when and to what ex-
tent an individual exhibits gender behavior. But there is no consensus about how 
to do this. Horvath notes: 
the aspects of behavior and physiology that researchers treat as markers of 
‘gender’ (rather than sex, class, or culture) differ greatly from study to study 
and from scientist to scientist. they [the scientists] provide no uniform, consis-
tent method for identifying and measuring the biologically significant compo-
nents of gender. 
… particular combinations and degrees of the attributes, interests, attitudes, 
behaviors, etc. manifested may substantially vary between people with 
equally strong, unambiguous gender identities… 
Horvath concludes “gender-typical phenomena are multi-dimensional and mul-
tifactorial” (Horvath, 1999). Furthermore, certain components of gender, such as 
preference for certain kinds of attire or occupations, are unlikely to be directly 
based in biology. Some aspects of gender and gender role are culturally relative. 
One cannot define a kind of social role that all and only women have, historically, 
cross-culturally, or even within modern societies. 
So, what is the person with cross-gender identification identifying with? A 
multi-dimensional, multi-factorial cluster of culturally relative psychological 
traits? Perhaps. Let me put the question another way. The biological male with 
GID claims to have the feelings and reactions typical of women. But what feel-
ings and reactions are typical of women? Many people probably have more in 
common, in terms of feelings and reactions, with members of their own social 
group, such as their family, church, peer group, occupation, class, or culture, 
than they do with members of their own sex in different social groups. Perhaps 
the person with GID only identifies with the opposite sex within his or her soci-
ety. Different societies have somewhat different gender norms, so one person-
ality type might identify as female in one society, but as male in another. But, 
if it is a consequence of social factors that only women typically have a particu-
lar set of feelings and reactions, then to insist that only someone with a female 
body type should have those feelings and reactions is to valorize the gender 
norms of that society. Even if biological factors determine that women typically 
have certain psychological characteristics, to insist that someone with these 
psychological characteristics should have a female body type is to stand as a de-
fender of the norm. 
Ge n d e r id e n t i t y di s o r d e r 147
The American Psychiatric Association claims that it plays no such a role. Ac-
cording to the DSM-IV, “Neither deviant behavior … nor conflicts that are pri-
marily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the devi-
ance or conflict is a symptom of dysfunction.” But interestingly, the manual says 
“GID can be distinguished from simple nonconformity to stereo-typical sex role 
behavior” not because it is a symptom of a dysfunction but “by the extent and 
pervasiveness of the cross-gender wishes, interests, and activities” (Task Force on 
DSM-IV and American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Apparently, if the deviance 
is severe enough, it does count as a disorder. And what could be more severe 
than repudiation of a society’s gender norms? 
6. Conclusion 
Admittedly, the world contains masculine men, and feminine women, but 
these categories are not exhaustive, exception-less, immutable, or clearly defined. 
Different societies have had different standards for categorizing people accord-
ing to gender. Whether an individual is considered a man, woman, or something 
else, in a society depends upon the standards of that society, and whether the in-
dividual has the physical and psychological features to satisfy that those stan-
dards. In societies with exactly two well-defined gender norms, individuals feel 
pressured to exemplify one cluster of characteristics, to the exclusion of the other. 
A list of characteristics is difficult, if not impossible to articulate in any great de-
tail, but it typically includes primary and secondary sex characteristics, modes of 
dress and grooming, personality, preferences, occupations, expectations, and re-
lationships. While we can argue about how “natural” it is for most people to ex-
emplify one cluster of characteristics to the exclusion of the other, clearly a signif-
icant number of individuals (conservatively 10,000 in the U.S.) find it difficult to 
exemplify an acceptable cluster. 
While transsexuals may seem to challenge gender norms, in a sense, they em-
brace them. The desire to change one’s body to match one’s perceived gender 
identity reveals acceptance of the idea that sex and gender must coincide, that 
certain behaviors and desires are incompatible with certain physical characteris-
tics. The transsexual does not reject the gender roles of his society; he merely re-
jects one gender role in favor of another (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). MtFs do not typ-
ically object to stereotypes of women—they want to personify those stereotypes, 
and often display an exaggerated femininity. But perhaps this says less about the 
transsexual’s “gender identity” and more about her society. 
Most societies assign individuals to one of two possible genders, and which 
gender you are assigned determines the character of your interactions with oth-
ers and your life prospects in countless ways. In some societies, if one is uncom-
fortable with one’s gender role, there is exactly one other option—the opposite 
gender role. But to succeed in that role, one must look the part. For some people, 
physical alteration is their best chance of conforming to an available and accept-
able gender option. While the standard view sees the pre-operative transsexual as 
a person with a conflict between mind and body, the FtM philosopher Adam Par-
ascandola wonders “… is it that my internal self is in conflict with society’s view of 
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my external body? … I often wonder, if society did not insist on granting identity 
based on external characteristics, whether I would have felt the need to change 
my body” [(Parascandola, 2001) my emphasis]. If it weren’t for the fact that so 
many facets of one’s life are largely determined by the gender that one appears 
to be, would there be a need to change bodies to “match” minds? I suspect not. I 
suspect that the phenomenon of cross-gender identification has more to do with 
a broad range of personality types trying to cope with a rigid two-gender sys-
tem than it does with “crossed wires” or souls that end up in the wrong kind of 
body. Hence, I suggest that so called “GID” is primarily a conflict between the in-
dividual and her society, and only derivatively a conflict between the individual 
and her body. Greater social tolerance of gender diversity could create a context 
within which such individuals would not be considered “disordered.” 
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